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Commentary on Ward
Myrna Gabbe

Any interpretation of Aristotle’s fantasiva should aim to account for the unusual
presentation he gives of it in De Anima III 3. The procedure of this chapter is not typical
to his investigations into the soul’s faculties. His accounts usually proceed from an
examination of its objects, since they determine the nature and character of its activities.1
But Aristotle does not clearly state what the objects of fantasiva are, leading some
scholars to conclude that it has no objects of its own and, hence, is not a genuine or full
faculty.2 Instead of detailing its objects, he begins the chapter with the argument that his
predecessors cannot account for the possibility of error because they take senseperceiving (aijsqavnesqai) to be identical to understanding (fronei`n, 427a21-22).
Fantasiva is abruptly introduced in the course of this discussion. After distinguishing
sense-perception from understanding (fronei`n) and thinking (noei`n), Aristotle writes,
“For fantasiva is different from sense-perception and discursive thought” (427b14-15).
He then turns his attention to fantasiva, but to specify, at least initially, what it is not.
The negative analysis effectively provides a list of features fantasiva can have; however,
we are left to wonder which of these features are essential to it, if any. It is only in the
last section of the chapter beginning at 428b10 that Aristotle provides something of a
positive account. Fantasiva, he there explains, is a motion that occurs as the result of
actual sense-perceiving (428b13, b25-26), is similar to sense-perception (428b14), and is
that in virtue of which its possessor can do and be affected by many things (428b16-17).
Some scholars take this to be the definitive account;3 others deny that it can be regarded
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as the culmination of the inquiry.4 The problem is that this account seems to treat
fantasiva as if it were a derivative capacity responsible for residual sense-impressions.
For such an account is in tension with many of the examples that Aristotle provides of
this activity: examples that connect the faculty to the having of appearances.
But Aristotle’s atypical treatment of fantasiva is no reflection of the importance
he affords to it for explaining animal and human psychology. We can assume that
fantasiva has some connection to error: a state Aristotle describes as “more characteristic
of animals” and one that “the soul continues in longer” (427b1-2). The term ‘fantasiva’
is used in connection with two kinds of sensory activities. It refers to sense-perceptions
that are indistinct or inaccurate, as indicated by the locution “it appears to be x,” and is
used in connection with sensory activities that take place when the senses are inactive
with respect to what appears. Fantasivai of this latter sort occur either when the senses
are inhibited, as when we dream or hallucinate, or when they are active but not with
respect to the objects appearing, as when we imagine, recollect, have after-images, or call
to mind a favntasma in the service of thought. It is Aristotle’s view that fantavsmata are
employed in all types of thinking. When we reflect practically, fantavsmata serve as
aijsqhvmata that help us determine what is good or bad and what ought to be pursued or
avoided (De Anima. III 7, 431a14-16; 431b2-9). Similarly, when we reason discursively,
we do so by reflecting on the information retained from our sense-experiences (An. III 8,
432a3-8). But even understanding involves fantasiva. “For,” Aristotle says, “when we
contemplate (qewrh/)` we at the same time necessarily contemplate a favntasma” (An. III
8, 432a8-9).
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Prof. Ward’s interpretation of De Anima III 3 is commendable for its efforts to
explain why Aristotle strays from his usual method of characterizing a faculty, how, if at
all, a single faculty can accommodate such a wide variety of activities, and what role it
plays in the possibility of error. Maintaining that “none of the recent scholars but one has
found the correct perspective with which to assess the chapter” (18), Ward follows
Caston’s lead by asking how fantasiva can contribute to error. But her interpretation is
novel insofar as she does not seek a unitary account that can explain its involvement in
sundry activities. She argues that ‘fantasiva’ does not refer to the same faculty across
uses and, therefore, Aristotle’s inquiry cannot proceed as his others: namely, by
investigation into its objects.
Ward’s approach draws from her work on homonymy. Homonymous terms share
a name in common but have different meanings. Some homonymous terms are
accidentally so, in which case one cannot hope to find a relation between their uses.
Related homonyms, by contrast, share some, though not all, common features.
According to Ward, non-accidental homonyms can exhibit a range of relations including
core-dependency, where the term “has a primary and a secondary use (or uses) with the
primary that upon which the other uses depend” (7).
Upon establishing that ‘fantasiva’ does not refer to a single capacity, Ward seeks
to determine its primary use. Taking fantasiva as necessary for the possibility of error,
and error as requiring a “separation, or divergence, of the object causing a mental state
from the content of that state” (19), Ward concludes that the primary use of the term
signifies “the motion arising from sense-perception but distinct from it as bifurcation
requires such that the possessor can act and be affected in many ways” (28). This
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minimal description is meant to capture the thrust of Aristotle’s positive treatment of
fantasiva beginning at 428b10. The stipulation that all fantasiva involves bifurcation is
meant to explain its role in error as well as our ability to reflect on or call to mind a
sensible object in its absence. Without this latter capacity, we could not desire, move or
think.
Ward’s treatment of Aristotle’s positive account evades the tension that results
from the decaying-sense interpretation. But because she takes the last section of De
Anima III 3 as describing only those features a fantasiva must have, imagining,
dreaming, remembering, having after-images, hallucinating, and indistinct perceiving are,
on her theory, “‘secondary’ cases of fantasiva,” presupposing the primary account “in
the sense that they all involve motions derived from sense-perception that are
characterized by bifurcation” (28). Ward denies that bifurcation can be the feature that
makes ‘fantasiva’ synonymous because the examples of its activity “exhibit bifurcation
in different ways” (28). Ward does not explain how this is so; nonetheless, at the outset
of her paper she argued against its synonymy, claiming that fantasivai are experientially
different owing to the fact that each type of fantasiva has its own objects and a
corresponding way of considering those objects. Take, for instance, her description of
the following three types of fantasivai: appearances conflicting with beliefs, dreams and
memories. She writes:
We may specify these three kinds of fantasiva -objects as follows: (i) a
perceptual object, e.g., the size of the sun, being considered as not being actively
perceived; (ii) a perceptual object, a dream, being considered as being actively
perceived; (iii) a perceptual object, a memory-object, being considered as not
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actively perceived, but as a likeness of something actively perceived in the past
(15).
Her theory is that fantasiva is directed at perceptual experiences, fantavsmata, and,
therefore, there are as many uses of the term ‘fantasiva’ as there are different types of
fantavsmata.
Pace Ward, I suspect that fantasiva is just one of the faculties responsible for the
ways things appear to us – that how things appear when we dream or think have to do
with the complex of faculties working together. Thus I propose to look at the assumption
that gives rise to her approach: namely, that fantavsmata are the objects of fantasiva.
To be clear, Ward does not take fantavsmata to be physical pictorial images that
are viewed and contemplated. She appears to follow D. Modrak in taking fantasiva to be
an awareness of the sensory content of a sensory experience.5 But while Modrak
distinguishes fantasiva from sense-perception in terms of the conditions under which the
perceiver is subject – fantasiva, she explains, occurs when the conditions are not
conducive to veridical perception as determined by normal percipients6 – Ward
distinguishes the two types of cognitions in terms of their psychological features. In her
view, fantasiva involves a special directness towards an internal mental state, the
favntasma. So where sense-perception has for its objects external sensible properties, a
fantasiva has for its object an internal mental state, such as “indistinct present
perceptions, dreams, after-images and memories, as well as the sensory elements of
imagining, thinking, and planning” (14).
This is an improvement on Modrak’s thesis. In the interest of providing a unified
account of sensory activity, Modrak treats sensible objects, aijsqhtav, as mental items first
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and foremost.7 She does recognize that Aristotle uses ‘aijsqhtav’ to refer to the sensible
features of an external object, but argues that the “proper sensible exists potentially in the
physical characteristics that bring about its perception.”8 It is hard to understand how
something that is potential can bring about a change in the sense-faculty. So if Aristotle
sometimes describes the internal aijsqhtovn as actual, that is because sense-perceiving is
the assimilation of the sense faculty to the external sensible; hence, prior to senseperceiving, the sense-faculty must be potentially what the external object is actually (An.
II 5, 418a3-6). Moreover, Modrak’s view awkwardly limits ai[sqhsi~ to veridical cases of

sense-perception, when Aristotle states quite clearly that ai[sqhsi~ of both the incidental
and common sensibles has the possibility for error (An. III 3, 428b19-25).9
Ward provides two arguments for her claim that fantavsmata are the objects of
fantasiva. The first occurs in her explanation of incidental perception, which she offers
in order to show that fantavsmata do not represent a single unified class. She writes:
In the case of indistinct perception and fantasiva, perception is going on, but since
the object of perception is indistinct, we do not consider that object to be properly
causing our sensory object (which is, say, an indeterminately shaped thing). Given
that we take the actual, causal object to differ from the object of our sensory
experience, we often indicate our reservations in linguistic behavior. (14-15)
What Ward calls “the object of perception” is the external object of sense-perception;
“sensory object” refers to the favntasma. Ward reasons that because we would not blame
sensible objects for our blurry vision – objects are not blurry – our reservation must
regard the accuracy of our perceptual discernment, i.e., the favntasma. “We have,” she

6

writes in note xxiv, “reservation about the extent to which the favntasma is like the other
thing, the perception or the perceptible object.” She thus assumes that having a
reservation involves having a perceptional experience as an object.
Ward’s argument follows from the reasonable assumption that we do not typically
assent to fantasiva, at least not when the senses are active. But this assumption
presupposes that we do assent to ordinary sense-perceptions. Indeed, it is just because we
affirm our sense-perceptions that we can “know” things in a certain perceptual way and,
conversely, be in error. But if the withholding of an assent demonstrates that fantasiva is
about the favntasma, then the assent to a sense-perception should likewise demonstrate
that ai[sqhsi~ is about the ai[sqhma. It will not do, however, for Ward to concede that
ai[sqhsi~ has for its object the ai[sqhma, since doing so would open her theory to the
objections made against Modrak’s. But what this argument, I hope, shows is that the
experience of having an indistinct perception does not crucially differ from that of an
ordinary sense-perception – not enough to warrant a different structural account between
the two faculties. If, then, ai[sqhsi~ is of external objects, so too is fantasiva, at least
when the senses are active.
Ward’s second argument occurs in her explanation of Aristotle’s “best-known”
example of fantasiva: the example of the sun’s appearing to be a foot wide despite one’s
belief that it is larger than the inhabited world (428b3-4). Ward argues that if we can say
that something appears to us in a manner that conflicts with our beliefs about that object,
that is because the object of fantasiva is different from the object of belief (dovxa). She
concludes, then, that fantasiva cannot share the same object with sense-perception, since
belief and sense-perception have the same object (428a27-28).
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It is not hard to piece together how Ward arrived at this interpretation of the sun
example, if we consider how the verbs ‘to appear’ and ‘to see’ are used. One cannot say,
“I see a foot wide sun, but believe it to be bigger than the inhabited world.” Yet one can
say, “The sun appears to be a foot across, though I believe it to be larger than the
inhabited world.” Ward notes that the conflict regarding the claims, “I see a sun that is
one foot wide” and “I believe the sun to be larger than the inhabited world,” is due to the
fact that the object of sight is the same as the object of belief. She thereby concludes that
if we can say that the sun appears to be a foot wide but believe otherwise, it is because
our fantasiva and dovxa are about two different things. The appearance, to use her
description, is “bifurcated” from the belief (22).
Ward makes much of Aristotle’s claim that dovxa and ai[sqhsi~ are about the same
thing (428a27-28). But what is at issue is not the objects of fantasiva, but whether it is
some form of dovxa (428a18-19): whether it is dovxa with ai[sqhsi~, dovxa through
ai[sqhsi~ or a combination of the two (428a25-26). Dovxa, Aristotle explains, requires
conviction (pivsti~), which in turn requires lovgo~ (428a22-23). Arguably, then, the
reason why one cannot say, “I see a foot wide sun, but believe it to be much larger” is
because seeing involves believing. Indeed, when we are not sure of what we are seeing
(i.e., when we are unsure of what the external aijqhtovn is), we withhold our dovxa and
describe our sensory experience using the verb ‘to appear.’
If the sun example were designed to show that fantasiva has a different object from
ai[sqhsi~, we would expect Aristotle to mention this in his explanation of it. What he
says, rather, is this: If fantasiva involves dovxa, then, in the face of the sun’s appearance,
we would either have to abandon our true dovxa (that the sun is larger than the inhabited
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world), so long as nothing has changed or we have not forgotten our true beliefs, or admit
that the same dovxa (our belief about the sun’s appearance) is both true (because it appears
to us to be a foot wide) and false (because we also believe that the sun is larger than the
inhabited world) (428b4-9). Aristotle thereupon concludes that fantasiva is neither dovxa
nor ai[sqhsi~ nor a combination of the two (428b9). In fact, III 3 ends with the
observation that brutes follow fantasiva because they do not have reason, and humans
too, so long as our nou`~ is inhibited by passion, disease or sleep (429a4-8).
There might be confusion regarding the sun example because we do not always use
‘appear’ in cases where we withhold our beliefs. We can say, for instance, “I see the sun
as a foot across” (Aristotle’s example of fantasiva), just as easily as we can say, “I see
the white object before me as the son of Diares” (Aristotle’s example of incidental
perception). Thus, the ‘seeing-as’ construction can be used to articulate incidental
perceptions as well as fantasivai. But Aristotle is quite clear that fantasiva is not any
type of ai[sqhsi~ (428b9). Yet if fantasiva were dovxa with, or through, or in
combination with ai[sqhsi~, it would be incidental perception. Hence, about this view he
critically writes: “to imagine is to opine about whatever is perceived not incidentally”
(428b1-2). That is to say, to imagine is to have beliefs about the proper sensibles. The
sun example, I have argued, shows that fantasiva does not involve belief and so serves to
distinguish incidental perception from fantasiva. And if this is Aristotle’s intent, then
neither is it the case that fantasiva and ai[sqhsi~ differ in terms of their internal
structures, as Ward suggests, nor is it that they differ in terms of the external conditions
of the perceiver, as Modrak suggests. When the senses are active, sense-perception is
distinguished from fantasiva in virtue of its relation or interplay with nou`~.
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So far my analysis has focused on fantasivai that occur when the senses are active
or uninhibited. Indeed, the problem of Ward’s thesis is highlighted in just these cases.
Ward emphasizes that fantavsmata are things that fantasiva has an awareness of: “where
fantasiva is present,” she writes, “what remains constant is that we are aware of one kind
of sensory object that has its cause in another object” (24). So when Aristotle explains
that indistinct perception is a case of fantasiva because “we say that this appears to us to
be a human” (428a13-14), Ward takes the favvntasma to be the referent of ‘this.’ “In such
cases,” she writes, “we are likely to adopt what Schofield terms a ‘skeptical attitude’
toward the object [i.e., favntasma] that is appearing to us” (15). Thus on Ward’s analysis,
what appears is not a human being, as Aristotle says, but a sensory experience that has for
its content a human being. Furthermore, her interpretation is at odds with Aristotle’s
description of fantasiva as “that in virtue of which we say that a favntasma occurs to us”
(428a1-2). Lines 428a1-2 indicate that a favntasma is an appearance that we experience,
not an experience that we are aware of or cognize. The senses are already aware of both
that and what we sense-perceive. Having an awareness of the content of our perceptual
experience in addition to the awareness we already have of it is redundant.
The same criticism holds more generally in cases where the senses are inactive or
incapacitated. Take dreaming, for instance. Ward does not want to say that fantasiva
views dream images, because that would require positing pictorial images. But neither
does she want to say that fantasiva makes us aware of the fact that we are dreaming,
since we are unaware, more often than not, that we are dreaming. The only other
possibility is that fantasiva makes us aware of our dream experiences that we would
otherwise fail to notice, a notion that Gallop describes as incoherent.10 Still, Ward might
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think she has a parallel in De anima III 2, wherein Aristotle asserts that sense-perceiving
involves the awareness that we are sense-perceiving. But for the parallel to hold, she
would have to admit that in order to perceive, say, red, the eyes would have to become
the sensible form of red – which is to say, they would have to perceive red – and also
perceive that they are perceiving red. But this effectually makes perceptual awareness
the same activity as perceiving. Aristotle insists that perceiving that we are seeing is not
the same as seeing, since this capacity recognizes when we are not seeing (425b20-22;
Som. 2,455a17-18). Hence, perceiving that we are seeing is a matter, not of perceiving
what we are perceiving, but of perceiving that we are perceiving. In other words, it is a
matter of perceiving that we are awake (Som. 455a12-b2). This capacity is presumably
inhibited when we are asleep, explaining why we do not typically sense either way
whether we are sleeping or not. But dovxa, we might add, can also be inhibited (429a7), in
which case it will affirm the favvntasma as if it is an ai[sqhma (Insom. 1, 459a6-8), and, I
suppose, provide us with a particularly vivid dream.
Ward’s intriguing approach stems from the difficulty philosophers have in tying
together all the activities of fantasiva by means of a single faculty. Ultimately, I think
her intuition is right – a single faculty cannot explain the many ways that fantavsmata
appear to us. But I suspect that if our fantasivai are experientially different from one
another that is due as much to fantasiva as to the other faculties involved. This is not the
place for a thoroughgoing argument, but it will prove instructive to consider the contrast
Ward draws between fantasiva involved in thinking and incidental perception to
motivate her approach. Ward argues that the two fantasivai cannot be the products of a
single faculty, since there is no common feature that binds the experiences; whereas
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incidental perception involves actual sense-experience, fantasiva in thought does not
even involve the experience of some qualia. Let us put aside the difficulty of
understanding how fantasiva, a faculty intimately related to the senses, can, on her view,
fail to consider the perceptual features of the favvntasma. What interests me is her
analysis of fantasiva from the perspective of our experiences. Ward imagines that we can
reflect on the experience of thinking to get at its imaginative and intellectual components.
But this is what I think steers her off course. Thinking certainly has these two
components, but because thinking is a unified experience, it does not work to parse out
fantasiva’s activity by reflecting on the cognitive experience of thinking. The
experience of dreaming should help us see this. If dreams differ from one another and
differ from other instances of fantasiva, such as the having of after-images or
hallucinations, that has as much to do with fantasiva as with the other faculties that
comprise our cognitive experiences. For arguably, the difference between the having of
after-images, on the one hand, and dreaming, on the other, is the incapacitation of the
senses in the latter case, and, for some, the incapacitation of the intellect as well.
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Cf. An. II 4, 415a16-21.
Cf. Caston 1996 and 1998; Wedin 1988, 45-63.
3
Cf. Wedin 1988, 24-27; Caston 1996, 46-54.
4
See for instance Nussbaum 1978, 251.
2
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Modrak 1986, 49-50 explains that when the senses are active, “sensory content” refers
to the sensible properties that “the external object possesses in relation to the percipient”;
when not, “a sensory content is an internal representation of sensible characters.”
6
Ibid., 51-52. “Whether a particular sensory apprehension is described as an instance of
ai[sqhsi~ or of fantasiva depends upon features of the total situation in which the object
is apprehended; these include the states of the percipient and states of the external
environment. Aristotle makes the choice depend upon the accuracy with which the
external object is apprehended, or more precisely, the likelihood of its being accurately
perceived. For the most part, the unqualified use of ai[sqhsi~ and its cognates in
psychological descriptions is limited to cases of veridical perception…A cognition whose
object is a sensory content is properly described as a perception just in case its object
represents a state of affairs in the external world as determined by normal percipients”.
See further her remarks on p. 67.
7
Ibid., 54. “The object of perception is a complex of sensible characters that belong to an
external object, as is the object of fantasiva in the case of non-veridical appearance. In
other cases of fantasiva, such as dreaming or remembering, its object is a complex of
sensible characters that represent an object not immediately present to the senses. Thus
fantasiva has the same type of object as perception (428b12); its object like the object of
perception is always a sensory content.”
8
Ibid., 53.
9
See note 6.
10
Gallop 1996, 49 writes: “The notion of an ‘unconscious dream’, a dream of which the
subject is totally unaware, would be as incoherent as that of, e.g. a pain the subject does
not feel.”
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